This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We define a class of games where the strong time consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on advertising games.
Cellini R. , Lambertini l. , Leitmann G. (2005). Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Differential Games. AACHEN : Shaker Verlag.
Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Differential Games
LAMBERTINI, LUCA;
2005
Abstract
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We define a class of games where the strong time consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on advertising games.File in questo prodotto:
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