This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We define a class of games where the strong time consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on advertising games.

Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Differential Games

LAMBERTINI, LUCA;
2005

Abstract

This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We define a class of games where the strong time consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on advertising games.
Modeling and Control of Autonomous Decision Support Based Systems. Proceedings of the 13th International Workshop on Dynamics and Control
185
192
Cellini R. ; Lambertini l. ; Leitmann G.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11585/8177
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