Sectors with a long regulatory tradition have recently experienced intense activity by multinationals whose international operations and relocation threats represent a new cause for concern for regulators. I analyse a multinational serving two countries and being regulated by two national authorities. The firm is shown to favor, or cross-subsidize, the country with a larger stake in the firm's profit and the linkage among national regulations may induce unexpected effects on outputs. I also analyze multinational's lobbying decisions and its effects on national regulations. Finally, a credible threat to "fly" away from tough regulators lets the firm obtain larger profits.
Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises / G. Calzolari. - In: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 0020-6598. - STAMPA. - 45-1:(2004), pp. 257-282.
Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises
CALZOLARI, GIACOMO
2004
Abstract
Sectors with a long regulatory tradition have recently experienced intense activity by multinationals whose international operations and relocation threats represent a new cause for concern for regulators. I analyse a multinational serving two countries and being regulated by two national authorities. The firm is shown to favor, or cross-subsidize, the country with a larger stake in the firm's profit and the linkage among national regulations may induce unexpected effects on outputs. I also analyze multinational's lobbying decisions and its effects on national regulations. Finally, a credible threat to "fly" away from tough regulators lets the firm obtain larger profits.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.