Approccio pragmatico e libertà semantica : un confronto tra Ruggero Bacone e Pietro di Giovanni Olivi sulla teoria del significato

This paper aims at investigating the influence that Roger Bacon’s De signis had on Peter John Olivi’s account of signification. The analysis of some topics discussed in his Quaestiones logicales will show Olivi’s familiarity with Bacon’s writings ; furthermore, similar aspects of their theories (a semiotic distinction grounded on Augustin ; the idea that common names mean primarily things rather than concepts ; the theory of ampliatio and restrictio) will reveal that Olivi’s pragmatic account of signification is inspired by Bacon’s. Nevertheless, as Quid ponat ius vel dominium shows, Olivi is not uncritical towards Bacon and, in particular, the idea that meanings can be changed daily in a free and silent way as De signis stated. In addition to a signification of words actually used by speakers (significatio actualis), Olivi introduces a habitual signification of words (significatio habitualis), in order to guarantee a certain degree of stability to the meanings. As a result, unlike Bacon, when speakers change the meaning of words without saying it clearly, instead of establishing a new sign they just become liars. Therefore, in Olivi’s pragmatic account of signification speakers have a semantic freedom but, unlike Bacon, this freedom is morally connotated and defines the speaker as a morally free person.