The paper investigates the effect of electoral rules on voter turnout. It focuses on Italian municipalities,where a single ballot system applies to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, while a dualballot system applies above that threshold. By exploiting this discontinuity, the paper finds that the dualballot increases participation at the local polls by about 1 percentage point. The increase in voter turnoutis associated with broader political representation, higher quality politicians, and greater fiscal discipline.Finally, we document that the higher political participation triggered by local electoral rules extends tonationwide voting contexts.
Guglielmo Barone, Guido de Blasio (2013). Electoral rules and voter turnout. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 36, 25-35.
Electoral rules and voter turnout
Guglielmo Barone;
2013
Abstract
The paper investigates the effect of electoral rules on voter turnout. It focuses on Italian municipalities,where a single ballot system applies to municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, while a dualballot system applies above that threshold. By exploiting this discontinuity, the paper finds that the dualballot increases participation at the local polls by about 1 percentage point. The increase in voter turnoutis associated with broader political representation, higher quality politicians, and greater fiscal discipline.Finally, we document that the higher political participation triggered by local electoral rules extends tonationwide voting contexts.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
