Using a sample of banks from 36 countries, we document that accounting enforcement is negatively related to bank risk-taking. We also provide evidence that accounting enforcement enhances bank stability during the crisis. In addition, we show that banks assume less risk through more conservative lending decisions and a reduction in complexity in jurisdictions with higher accounting enforcement. Our results show that formal institutions such as accounting enforcement are associated with bank financial decisions and risk-taking behavior.
Dal Maso L., Kanagaretnam K., Lobo G.J., Mazzi F. (2020). Is accounting enforcement related to risk-taking in the banking industry?. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, 49, 1-15 [10.1016/j.jfs.2020.100758].
Is accounting enforcement related to risk-taking in the banking industry?
Dal Maso L.;
2020
Abstract
Using a sample of banks from 36 countries, we document that accounting enforcement is negatively related to bank risk-taking. We also provide evidence that accounting enforcement enhances bank stability during the crisis. In addition, we show that banks assume less risk through more conservative lending decisions and a reduction in complexity in jurisdictions with higher accounting enforcement. Our results show that formal institutions such as accounting enforcement are associated with bank financial decisions and risk-taking behavior.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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2020_JFS.pdf
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