We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one's own product to that of a rival's, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.

F. Barigozzi, P. Garella, M. Peitz (2009). With A Little Help From My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 18(4), 1071-1094.

With A Little Help From My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality

BARIGOZZI, FRANCESCA;
2009

Abstract

We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one's own product to that of a rival's, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.
2009
F. Barigozzi, P. Garella, M. Peitz (2009). With A Little Help From My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 18(4), 1071-1094.
F. Barigozzi; P. Garella; M. Peitz
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/77278
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