This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in markets dominated by multisided digital platforms. First, we doc- ument almost 300 acquisitions carried out by three major tech companies— Amazon, Facebook, and Google—between 2008 and 2018. We cluster target companies on their area of economic activity providing suggestive evidence on the strategies behind these mergers. Second, we discuss the features of digital markets that create new challenges for competition policy. By using relevant case studies as illustrative examples, we discuss theories of harm that have been used or, alternatively, could have been formulated by authorities in these cases. Finally, we retrospectively examine two important merger cases, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze, providing a systematic assessment of the theories of harm considered by the UK competition authorities as well as evidence on the evolution of the market after the transactions were approved. We discuss whether the competition authority performed complete and careful analyses to foresee the competitive consequences of the investigated mergers and whether a more effective merger control regime can be achieved within the current legal framework.
Elena Argentesi, Paolo Buccirossi, Emilio Calvano, T.D. (2021). Merger Policy in Digital Markets: An Ex-Post Assessment. JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS, 17(1), 95-140 [10.1093/joclec/nhaa020].
Merger Policy in Digital Markets: An Ex-Post Assessment
Elena Argentesi;Emilio Calvano;Alessia Marrazzo;
2021
Abstract
This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in markets dominated by multisided digital platforms. First, we doc- ument almost 300 acquisitions carried out by three major tech companies— Amazon, Facebook, and Google—between 2008 and 2018. We cluster target companies on their area of economic activity providing suggestive evidence on the strategies behind these mergers. Second, we discuss the features of digital markets that create new challenges for competition policy. By using relevant case studies as illustrative examples, we discuss theories of harm that have been used or, alternatively, could have been formulated by authorities in these cases. Finally, we retrospectively examine two important merger cases, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze, providing a systematic assessment of the theories of harm considered by the UK competition authorities as well as evidence on the evolution of the market after the transactions were approved. We discuss whether the competition authority performed complete and careful analyses to foresee the competitive consequences of the investigated mergers and whether a more effective merger control regime can be achieved within the current legal framework.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Merger_Policy.pdf
Open Access dal 22/07/2022
Tipo:
Postprint
Licenza:
Licenza per accesso libero gratuito
Dimensione
949.98 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
949.98 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.