This article examines the management of the recent banking crisis in Italy. In particular, we investigate the changing coalitional dynamics among Italian banks with a view to identifying the conditions under which banks are more likely to share the costs of crisis management. We argue that banks’ preferences are significantly shaped by the institutional context within which they operate. In particular, the establishment of Banking Union in the European Union (EU) significantly weakened the traditional coalitional dynamics among Italian banks by injecting uncertainty about the distributional effects of crisis management policy solutions.
Moschella M., Quaglia L. (2019). European Banking Union to the Rescue? How Supranational Institutions Influenced Crisis Management in Italy. SOUTH EUROPEAN SOCIETY & POLITICS, 24(4), 421-440 [10.1080/13608746.2020.1728957].
European Banking Union to the Rescue? How Supranational Institutions Influenced Crisis Management in Italy
Moschella M.;Quaglia L.
2019
Abstract
This article examines the management of the recent banking crisis in Italy. In particular, we investigate the changing coalitional dynamics among Italian banks with a view to identifying the conditions under which banks are more likely to share the costs of crisis management. We argue that banks’ preferences are significantly shaped by the institutional context within which they operate. In particular, the establishment of Banking Union in the European Union (EU) significantly weakened the traditional coalitional dynamics among Italian banks by injecting uncertainty about the distributional effects of crisis management policy solutions.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.