CRIS Current Research Information System
IRIS è la soluzione IT che facilita la raccolta e la gestione dei dati relativi alle attività e ai prodotti della ricerca. Fornisce a ricercatori, amministratori e valutatori gli strumenti per monitorare i risultati della ricerca, aumentarne la visibilità e allocare in modo efficace le risorse disponibili.
EnglishWe show that managerial delegation based upon comparative performance may generate collusive outcomes observationally equivalent to those typically associated with repeated games or cross ownership. This happens when rivals’ profits are positively weighted in the managerial incentive scheme. We also identify the level of time discounting at which a repeated game based upon Nash reversion would achieve the same degree of collusion. Accordingly, such managerial contracts should attract the attention of antitrust authorities
| Titolo: | On the collusive nature of managerial contracts based on comparative performance | |
| Autore/i: | Flavio Delbono; Luca Lambertini | |
| Autore/i Unibo: | ||
| Anno: | 2020 | |
| Rivista: | ||
| Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2019.11.002 | |
| Abstract: | We show that managerial delegation based upon comparative performance may generate collusive outcomes observationally equivalent to those typically associated with repeated games or cross ownership. This happens when rivals’ profits are positively weighted in the managerial incentive scheme. We also identify the level of time discounting at which a repeated game based upon Nash reversion would achieve the same degree of collusion. Accordingly, such managerial contracts should attract the attention of antitrust authorities | |
| Data stato definitivo: | 2020-03-28T12:11:06Z | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.01 Articolo in rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Descrizione | Tipo | Licenza | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| On the collusive nature postprint.pdf | Postprint | Licenza per Accesso Aperto. Creative Commons Attribuzione - Non commerciale - Non opere derivate (CCBYNCND) | Embargo: 07/11/2021 Contatta l'autore | |
| On the collusive nature pre print.pdf | Preprint | Licenza per Accesso Aperto. Altra tipologia di licenza compatibile con Open Access | Open Access Visualizza/Apri |
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/753263
Copyright © 2021