We study the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax- evading agents, allowing for imitation rather than rationality in the evolution of available strategies distribution in the population. The general framework of the approach combines a classical model for tax evasion where agents are imitators rather than rational optimizers and form an endogenized subjective probability of audit. A regulator chooses values to available policy instruments, either myopically or optimally -within an optimal control setup-, always with respect to the behavior of agents. A comparison is drawn between the evolu- tionary and rational case in order to evaluate the dierences that occur.
On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents / Xepapadeas, Anastasios, Petrohilos-Andrianos, Yannis. - In: JOURNAL OF DYNAMICS AND GAMES. - ISSN 2164-6066. - STAMPA. - 3:3(2016), pp. 231-260. [10.3934/jdg.2016013]
On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents
Xepapadeas Anastasios
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
2016
Abstract
We study the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax- evading agents, allowing for imitation rather than rationality in the evolution of available strategies distribution in the population. The general framework of the approach combines a classical model for tax evasion where agents are imitators rather than rational optimizers and form an endogenized subjective probability of audit. A regulator chooses values to available policy instruments, either myopically or optimally -within an optimal control setup-, always with respect to the behavior of agents. A comparison is drawn between the evolu- tionary and rational case in order to evaluate the dierences that occur.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
