We study the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax- evading agents, allowing for imitation rather than rationality in the evolution of available strategies distribution in the population. The general framework of the approach combines a classical model for tax evasion where agents are imitators rather than rational optimizers and form an endogenized subjective probability of audit. A regulator chooses values to available policy instruments, either myopically or optimally -within an optimal control setup-, always with respect to the behavior of agents. A comparison is drawn between the evolu- tionary and rational case in order to evaluate the dierences that occur.
Xepapadeas, A. (2016). On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents. JOURNAL OF DYNAMICS AND GAMES, 3(3), 231-260 [10.3934/jdg.2016013].
On the Evolution of Compliance and Regulation with Tax Evading Agents
Xepapadeas Anastasios
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
2016
Abstract
We study the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax- evading agents, allowing for imitation rather than rationality in the evolution of available strategies distribution in the population. The general framework of the approach combines a classical model for tax evasion where agents are imitators rather than rational optimizers and form an endogenized subjective probability of audit. A regulator chooses values to available policy instruments, either myopically or optimally -within an optimal control setup-, always with respect to the behavior of agents. A comparison is drawn between the evolu- tionary and rational case in order to evaluate the dierences that occur.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
