We explore if fairness and inequality motivations affect cooperation in indefinitely repeated games. Each round, we randomly divided experimental participants into donor–recipient pairs. Donors could make a gift to recipients, and ex-ante earnings are highest when all donors give. Roles were randomly reassigned every period, which induced inequality in ex-post earnings. Theoretically, income-maximizing players do not have to condition on this inequality because it is payoff-irrelevant. Empirically, payoff-irrelevant inequality affected participants’ ability to coordinate on efficient play: donors conditioned gifts on their own past roles and, with inequalities made visible, discriminated against those who were better off.

Do economic inequalities affect long-run cooperation & prosperity? / Camera, G., C. Deck, David Porter. - In: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1386-4157. - STAMPA. - 23:(2020), pp. 53-83. [10.1007/s10683-019-09610-5]

Do economic inequalities affect long-run cooperation & prosperity?

Camera G.
;
2020

Abstract

We explore if fairness and inequality motivations affect cooperation in indefinitely repeated games. Each round, we randomly divided experimental participants into donor–recipient pairs. Donors could make a gift to recipients, and ex-ante earnings are highest when all donors give. Roles were randomly reassigned every period, which induced inequality in ex-post earnings. Theoretically, income-maximizing players do not have to condition on this inequality because it is payoff-irrelevant. Empirically, payoff-irrelevant inequality affected participants’ ability to coordinate on efficient play: donors conditioned gifts on their own past roles and, with inequalities made visible, discriminated against those who were better off.
2020
Do economic inequalities affect long-run cooperation & prosperity? / Camera, G., C. Deck, David Porter. - In: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1386-4157. - STAMPA. - 23:(2020), pp. 53-83. [10.1007/s10683-019-09610-5]
Camera, G., C. Deck, David Porter
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/724436
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