We model a society that values coherence between the long-term commitment of politicians to given levels of public good provision and current policy. In that context, we suggest a novel mechanism by which issuing government debt can affect electoral results. Debt is exploited by an incumbent politician who favors a low level of public good supply, taking advantage of the cost paid by her opponent, who is committed to a higher level of supply. More public debt reduces voters’ preferred level of public good consumption and therefore are less likely to elect the opponent, given her commitment to a losing policy.

Politicians’ coherence and government debt

Bellettini G.
;
2020

Abstract

We model a society that values coherence between the long-term commitment of politicians to given levels of public good provision and current policy. In that context, we suggest a novel mechanism by which issuing government debt can affect electoral results. Debt is exploited by an incumbent politician who favors a low level of public good supply, taking advantage of the cost paid by her opponent, who is committed to a higher level of supply. More public debt reduces voters’ preferred level of public good consumption and therefore are less likely to elect the opponent, given her commitment to a losing policy.
Bellettini G.; Roberti P.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Policitians.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipo: Preprint
Licenza: Licenza per accesso libero gratuito
Dimensione 508.04 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
508.04 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11585/716157
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 2
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 2
social impact