We consider in this paper a dynamic resource allocation scheme between several Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), sharing common radio resources at a Cloud-based Radio Access Network (C-RAN) run by a central operator. We specifically propose a two-level coupled auction so as to enhance resource utilization and maximize the revenues both for the central operator and the MVNOs: at the lower level, end users belonging to a given MVNO bid for resources and, at the higher-level, MVNOs compete for resources at the central operator based on the output of the lower-level auction. We show fundamental economic properties of our proposal: truthfulness and individual rationality, and propose a greedy algorithm to enhance its computational efficiency. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for the global auction and its uniqueness in a typical duopoly scenario. Further numerical results illustrate the performance of our proposal in various network settings.
A two-level auction for resource allocation in multi-tenant C-RAN / Morcos, Mira; Chahed, Tijani; Chen, Lin; Elias, Jocelyne; Martignon, Fabio. - In: COMPUTER NETWORKS. - ISSN 1389-1286. - ELETTRONICO. - 135:(2018), pp. 240-252. [10.1016/j.comnet.2018.02.005]
A two-level auction for resource allocation in multi-tenant C-RAN
Elias, Jocelyne;
2018
Abstract
We consider in this paper a dynamic resource allocation scheme between several Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), sharing common radio resources at a Cloud-based Radio Access Network (C-RAN) run by a central operator. We specifically propose a two-level coupled auction so as to enhance resource utilization and maximize the revenues both for the central operator and the MVNOs: at the lower level, end users belonging to a given MVNO bid for resources and, at the higher-level, MVNOs compete for resources at the central operator based on the output of the lower-level auction. We show fundamental economic properties of our proposal: truthfulness and individual rationality, and propose a greedy algorithm to enhance its computational efficiency. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for the global auction and its uniqueness in a typical duopoly scenario. Further numerical results illustrate the performance of our proposal in various network settings.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.