This paper extends our previous logical analysis of presumptions and burden of proof by studying the force of a presumption once counterevidence has been offered. In the jurisprudential literature different accounts of this issue have been given: some have argued that a presumption is nullified by counterarguments while others have maintained that this gives presumptions a force that is too slight. We argue that these differences largely are not a matter of logic but of legal policy, and we show how the various accounts can be logically formalised.
More on Presumptions and Burdens of Proof / G. Sartor; H. Prakken. - STAMPA. - (2008), pp. 176-185. (Intervento presentato al convegno Jurix 2008 tenutosi a Firenze nel Dicembre 2008).
More on Presumptions and Burdens of Proof
SARTOR, GIOVANNI;
2008
Abstract
This paper extends our previous logical analysis of presumptions and burden of proof by studying the force of a presumption once counterevidence has been offered. In the jurisprudential literature different accounts of this issue have been given: some have argued that a presumption is nullified by counterarguments while others have maintained that this gives presumptions a force that is too slight. We argue that these differences largely are not a matter of logic but of legal policy, and we show how the various accounts can be logically formalised.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.