The chapter is a contribution to the analysis of prevalent constitutional subjectivities and variegating views of the purposes of constitutions in democratic societies in Europe. In addition, the objective is to explore, by means of the case-study of Italian constitutional reform, the changing nature of European constitutionalism, away from the constitution as an anti-totalitarian stronghold in the form of an entrenched higher law (in some cases), and evermore towards an instrument of technocratic constitutional engineering as well as an increasingly instrumental approach to the 1948 Constitution. This tendency, which is not confined to the Italian case, seems at least in part in contradiction with the post-WWII trend towards what some have called ‘new constitutionalism’, indicating a form of constitutionalism grounded in higher laws, entrenched rights, judicial review and independent constitutional courts, and, finally, an understanding of constitutional democracy as both a mode of protecting society from authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies and of safeguarding key democratic principle and rights.
File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti