Does property rights allocation on the commons affect marriage strategies and fertility? We focus on the role played by patrilineal vs. egalitarian inheritance systems. Our approach combines a theoretical model and an empirical study that exploits an institutional shock at the turn of the 19th century, which made inheritance on the common property-resources egalitarian for everyone. We report that – as predicted by the model – communities with patrilineal inheritance rights on the commons exhibit higher levels of endogamy and consanguinity and lower fertility than those with egalitarian inheritance rights.
Casari, M., Lisciandra, M., Tagliapietra, C. (2019). Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790–1820. EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 71, 72-92 [10.1016/j.eeh.2018.09.001].
Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790–1820
Casari, Marco;Tagliapietra, Claudio
2019
Abstract
Does property rights allocation on the commons affect marriage strategies and fertility? We focus on the role played by patrilineal vs. egalitarian inheritance systems. Our approach combines a theoretical model and an empirical study that exploits an institutional shock at the turn of the 19th century, which made inheritance on the common property-resources egalitarian for everyone. We report that – as predicted by the model – communities with patrilineal inheritance rights on the commons exhibit higher levels of endogamy and consanguinity and lower fertility than those with egalitarian inheritance rights.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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