In a homogeneous oligopoly, under standard regularity conditions, we prove that the Cournot–Nash equilibrium emerges under price competition and Cournot conjectures. We illustrate this result also under exogenous product differentiation.

Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini (2018). Cournot conjectures under price competition. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 14, 295-301 [10.1111/ijet.12159].

Cournot conjectures under price competition

Flavio Delbono;Luca Lambertini
2018

Abstract

In a homogeneous oligopoly, under standard regularity conditions, we prove that the Cournot–Nash equilibrium emerges under price competition and Cournot conjectures. We illustrate this result also under exogenous product differentiation.
2018
Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini (2018). Cournot conjectures under price competition. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 14, 295-301 [10.1111/ijet.12159].
Flavio Delbono; Luca Lambertini
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/648664
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