Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.
Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games / Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco. - In: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 1386-4157. - STAMPA. - 21:3(2018), pp. 673-691. [10.1007/s10683-017-9532-5]
Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games
Camera, Gabriele
;Casari, Marco
2018
Abstract
Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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