This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This allows a transparent characterization of the dynamic incentives created by contagious punishment schemes.

A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria / Camera, Gabriele*; Gioffré, Alessandro. - In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0304-4068. - STAMPA. - 50:1(2014), pp. 290-300. [10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.07.003]

A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria

Camera, Gabriele
;
2014

Abstract

This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games. The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This allows a transparent characterization of the dynamic incentives created by contagious punishment schemes.
2014
A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria / Camera, Gabriele*; Gioffré, Alessandro. - In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0304-4068. - STAMPA. - 50:1(2014), pp. 290-300. [10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.07.003]
Camera, Gabriele*; Gioffré, Alessandro
File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/635708
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 7
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 6
social impact