This paper provides a game-theoretical investigation on how to determine optimal strategies in dialogue games for argumentation. To make our ideas as widely applicable as possible, we adopt an abstract dialectical setting and, model dialogues as extensive games with perfect information where optimal strategies are determined by preferences over outcomes of the disputes. In turn, preferences are specified in terms of expected utility combining the probability of success of arguments with the costs and benefits associated to arguments.

R. Riveret, H. Prakken, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor (2008). Heuristics in Argumentation: A Game Theoretical Investigation. AMSTERDAM : IOS Press.

Heuristics in Argumentation: A Game Theoretical Investigation

RIVERET, REGIS;ROTOLO, ANTONINO;SARTOR, GIOVANNI
2008

Abstract

This paper provides a game-theoretical investigation on how to determine optimal strategies in dialogue games for argumentation. To make our ideas as widely applicable as possible, we adopt an abstract dialectical setting and, model dialogues as extensive games with perfect information where optimal strategies are determined by preferences over outcomes of the disputes. In turn, preferences are specified in terms of expected utility combining the probability of success of arguments with the costs and benefits associated to arguments.
2008
Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2008
324
335
R. Riveret, H. Prakken, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor (2008). Heuristics in Argumentation: A Game Theoretical Investigation. AMSTERDAM : IOS Press.
R. Riveret; H. Prakken; A. Rotolo; G. Sartor
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/63375
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