Compressed sensing has been proposed to both yield low-cost compression and low-cost encryption. This can be very useful in the design of sensor nodes with a limited resource budget whose acquisition must be kept as private as possible. We here analyze the susceptibility of compressed sensing stages that are optimized to maximize compression performance by rakeness-based design to ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks. A tradeoff between compression and security is highlighted. Notwithstanding such a tradeoff, rakeness-based compressed sensing exhibits a noteworthy robustness to classical attacks.
Titolo: | Low-Cost Security of IoT Sensor Nodes with Rakeness-Based Compressed Sensing: Statistical and Known-Plaintext Attacks | |
Autore/i: | Mangia, Mauro; Pareschi, Fabio; Rovatti, Riccardo; Setti, Gianluca | |
Autore/i Unibo: | ||
Anno: | 2018 | |
Rivista: | ||
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2017.2749982 | |
Abstract: | Compressed sensing has been proposed to both yield low-cost compression and low-cost encryption. This can be very useful in the design of sensor nodes with a limited resource budget whose acquisition must be kept as private as possible. We here analyze the susceptibility of compressed sensing stages that are optimized to maximize compression performance by rakeness-based design to ciphertext-only and known-plaintext attacks. A tradeoff between compression and security is highlighted. Notwithstanding such a tradeoff, rakeness-based compressed sensing exhibits a noteworthy robustness to classical attacks. | |
Data stato definitivo: | 2018-02-19T17:23:01Z | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.01 Articolo in rivista |
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