This contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s Extended Rationality is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean scepticism.
Volpe, G. (2017). Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE STUDY OF SKEPTICISM, 7(4), 258-271 [10.1163/22105700-00704004].
Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism
VOLPE, GIORGIO
2017
Abstract
This contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s Extended Rationality is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean scepticism.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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