The effects of cross-compliance depend on the strategies of participation/compliance of farmers, as well as on the ability of public administration to design appropriate policy mechanisms. The objective of this paper is to present a framework for the analysis of cross-compliance under asymmetric information with the option of differentiating commitments across farmers. The methodology is applied to a case study represented by the province of Bologna (Italy). The results show that, in the present conditions of control and sanctions, only a small share of farms is interested in complying with cross-compliance. The profitability of the choice of compliance/non-compliance depends mainly on the amount of single farm payment entitlements compared with the total land. The differentiation of restrictions across farmers, under relevant budget constraints for controls, appears a key strategic components in order to ensure the effectiveness of cross-compliance.

Effectiveness of cross-compliance under asymmetric information and differentiated compliance constraints / M. Raggi; F. Bartolini; V. Gallerani; D. Viaggi. - ELETTRONICO. - (2008), pp. 1-7. (Intervento presentato al convegno 12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 tenutosi a Ghent, Belgium nel 25-29 Augusta 2008).

Effectiveness of cross-compliance under asymmetric information and differentiated compliance constraints

RAGGI, MERI;BARTOLINI, FABIO;GALLERANI, VITTORIO ALESSANDRO;VIAGGI, DAVIDE
2008

Abstract

The effects of cross-compliance depend on the strategies of participation/compliance of farmers, as well as on the ability of public administration to design appropriate policy mechanisms. The objective of this paper is to present a framework for the analysis of cross-compliance under asymmetric information with the option of differentiating commitments across farmers. The methodology is applied to a case study represented by the province of Bologna (Italy). The results show that, in the present conditions of control and sanctions, only a small share of farms is interested in complying with cross-compliance. The profitability of the choice of compliance/non-compliance depends mainly on the amount of single farm payment entitlements compared with the total land. The differentiation of restrictions across farmers, under relevant budget constraints for controls, appears a key strategic components in order to ensure the effectiveness of cross-compliance.
2008
12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008
1
7
Effectiveness of cross-compliance under asymmetric information and differentiated compliance constraints / M. Raggi; F. Bartolini; V. Gallerani; D. Viaggi. - ELETTRONICO. - (2008), pp. 1-7. (Intervento presentato al convegno 12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 tenutosi a Ghent, Belgium nel 25-29 Augusta 2008).
M. Raggi; F. Bartolini; V. Gallerani; D. Viaggi
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/60872
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