This article examines the Reagan’s administration response to the nuclear scare and the ensuing antinuclear mobilization of the early 1980s. Specifically, it analyses the interaction between the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC) and the Administration’s Nuclear Arms Control Information Policy Group (NACIPIG), the ad hoc interdepartmental group created in order to counter the NWFC’s influence on public opinion and regain control of the debate on nuclear arms negotiations. By looking simultaneously at the NACIPIG’s records and the nuclear freeze campaign documents, the article analyses the interplay between the movement and the executive branch, aiming at understand how the White House responded to the domestic antinuclear challenge and in which way the movement influenced public opinion and affected in the end policy-making. The purpose is to offer a nuanced understanding of the role played by the antinuclear movement that, through its pressure on the U.S. public opinion and Congress, induced Reagan first to temper his bellicose rhetoric and then to alter his negotiating strategy with the Soviets.

Ronald Reagan, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear scare of the 1980s

SANTESE, ANGELA
2017

Abstract

This article examines the Reagan’s administration response to the nuclear scare and the ensuing antinuclear mobilization of the early 1980s. Specifically, it analyses the interaction between the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC) and the Administration’s Nuclear Arms Control Information Policy Group (NACIPIG), the ad hoc interdepartmental group created in order to counter the NWFC’s influence on public opinion and regain control of the debate on nuclear arms negotiations. By looking simultaneously at the NACIPIG’s records and the nuclear freeze campaign documents, the article analyses the interplay between the movement and the executive branch, aiming at understand how the White House responded to the domestic antinuclear challenge and in which way the movement influenced public opinion and affected in the end policy-making. The purpose is to offer a nuanced understanding of the role played by the antinuclear movement that, through its pressure on the U.S. public opinion and Congress, induced Reagan first to temper his bellicose rhetoric and then to alter his negotiating strategy with the Soviets.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/584703
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