We present a theoretical framework in which an elitist and a non-elitist university in a developed country compete by choosing admission standards and deciding whether or not to open a branch campus in a developing country. Students from a developing country attend university if either a branch campus is opened or, they can afford to move to the developed country. We find that the elitist university is more likely to open a branch campus. This result is reversed if the gain, in terms of prestige, to attend the home campus of the elitist university more than offsets a student's mobility costs. A rise in the graduate wage increases the incentive for opening a branch campus, although this incentive is stronger for the elitist university.
Poyago Theotoky, J., Tampieri, A. (2016). University Competition and Transnational Education: The Choice of Branch Campus. THE B.E. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 16(2), 739-766 [10.1515/bejte-2015-0052].
University Competition and Transnational Education: The Choice of Branch Campus
TAMPIERI, ALESSANDRO
2016
Abstract
We present a theoretical framework in which an elitist and a non-elitist university in a developed country compete by choosing admission standards and deciding whether or not to open a branch campus in a developing country. Students from a developing country attend university if either a branch campus is opened or, they can afford to move to the developed country. We find that the elitist university is more likely to open a branch campus. This result is reversed if the gain, in terms of prestige, to attend the home campus of the elitist university more than offsets a student's mobility costs. A rise in the graduate wage increases the incentive for opening a branch campus, although this incentive is stronger for the elitist university.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.