The evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that in long-run equilibrium, coexistence of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules is possible under regulation. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.
Xepapadeas, A. (2005). Regulation and evolution of compliance in common pool resources. THE SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 107(3), 583-599 [10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00424.x].
Regulation and evolution of compliance in common pool resources
XEPAPADEAS, ANASTASIOS
2005
Abstract
The evolution of compliance with regulation and the evolution of a CPR stock are modeled jointly in a setup where replicator dynamics describing compliance with harvesting rules are combined with resource stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach suggests that in long-run equilibrium, coexistence of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules is possible under regulation. Stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities could imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome. It might be easier for the regulator to obtain full compliance under precommitment to fixed auditing probabilities.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.