Abstract We investigate the R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in cost-reducing and quality enhancing R&D. Incentives along the two directions are inversely related to the size of market demand, and independent of each other. The stability analysis shows the existence of a unique stable steady state equilibrium, which is a saddle point. Finally, we show that the monopolist undersupplies product quality as compared to the social optimum, while its investment in the abatement of marginal cost is socially efficient.
Quality improvement and process innovation in monopoly: A dynamic analysis
LAMBERTINI, LUCA;ORSINI, RAIMONDELLO
2015
Abstract
Abstract We investigate the R&D portfolio of a monopolist investing in cost-reducing and quality enhancing R&D. Incentives along the two directions are inversely related to the size of market demand, and independent of each other. The stability analysis shows the existence of a unique stable steady state equilibrium, which is a saddle point. Finally, we show that the monopolist undersupplies product quality as compared to the social optimum, while its investment in the abatement of marginal cost is socially efficient.File in questo prodotto:
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