We propose a new theory of exclusive dealing. The theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals, and that the buyers' willingness to pay for the product is private information. In this setting, the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them, implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive. We discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases.
Calzolari, G., Denicolò, V. (2015). Exclusive contracts and market dominance. THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 105(11), 3321-3351 [10.1257/aer.20131664].
Exclusive contracts and market dominance
CALZOLARI, GIACOMO;DENICOLO', VINCENZO
2015
Abstract
We propose a new theory of exclusive dealing. The theory is based on the assumption that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals, and that the buyers' willingness to pay for the product is private information. In this setting, the dominant firm can impose contractual restrictions on buyers without necessarily compensating them, implying that exclusive dealing contracts can be both profitable and anticompetitive. We discuss the general implications of the theory for competition policy and illustrate by examples its applicability to antitrust cases.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
