Ockham, Plantinga and the Row of Ants

For millennia, philosophers have discussed whether divine omniscience is com- patible with human freedom – conceived of in a libertarian way – or not. If lib- ertarianism is true, some actions are free and no action is free unless it is within the agent’s power to act otherwise. This problem has a long history. It was addressed, discussed and purport- edly solved by a number of authors, among which Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, Aquinas, Ockham, Molina and various open theists, and has raised renewed in- terest after Nelson Pike’s article “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action” (Pike (1965)).² In his Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei respectu futur- orum contingentium (see, Ockham (1969)), Ockham famously defended the com- patibility of divine omniscience and human freedom by distinguishing between past propositions secundum vocem and secundum rem.