In this paper I will examine the notion of “Primary Iconism” by Umberto Eco and I will connect it to Peirce’s ideas from which it has been developed, with particular attention to the notions of intuition, index, cognition and the category of Secondness. I will affirm that the original formulation in Kant and the Platypus is not compatible with Peircean anti-intuitionism, but the changes made by Eco in “The Threshold and the Infinity” are. I will finally discuss the theses by Murphey, Short, Fumagalli and Gava that support a Peircean return to intuition, which is supposed to deny the original positions of the anti-Cartesian essays, and I will reject these theses.
Paolucci, C. (2015). Iconismo primario e gnoseologia semiotica. VS, 120, 135-150.
Iconismo primario e gnoseologia semiotica
PAOLUCCI, CLAUDIO
2015
Abstract
In this paper I will examine the notion of “Primary Iconism” by Umberto Eco and I will connect it to Peirce’s ideas from which it has been developed, with particular attention to the notions of intuition, index, cognition and the category of Secondness. I will affirm that the original formulation in Kant and the Platypus is not compatible with Peircean anti-intuitionism, but the changes made by Eco in “The Threshold and the Infinity” are. I will finally discuss the theses by Murphey, Short, Fumagalli and Gava that support a Peircean return to intuition, which is supposed to deny the original positions of the anti-Cartesian essays, and I will reject these theses.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.