An increasing number of firms with dual class shares are deciding to unify their sharesaround the world. In the most common type of stock unification a non-voting share can be converted into a voting share. In most countries either the price differential between the two classes of shares is low or a form of compensation for voting shareholders is provided. Italian stock unifications see the highest value of voting rights and no form of compensation for voting shareholders. I observe the 43 Italian stock unifications made in the 1974-2003 period and I develop a model that quantifies their wealth effects on the two classes of shares. Stock unifications can be a form of expropriation of minority voting shareholders, as confirmed by five case studies where majority shareholders hedge or even take advantage of such unifications by engaging in the following activities some months before the unification decision: buying relevant blocks of nv-shares, selling voting shares or approving stock option plans on nv-shares. At the stock unification announcement the price of a voting share in the five case studies dropped by a minimum of –4.26%, to a maximum of –10.41% confirming that dual class unifications can expropriate minority-voting shareholders to the benefit of the controlling shareholder and “lucky” minority nv-shareholders.

Dual class stock unifications and shareholders' wealth expropriation" / M Bigelli; V. Mehrotra. - ELETTRONICO. - (2004), pp. 1-43. (Intervento presentato al convegno Northern Finance Association Annual Meeting tenutosi a St. John, Newfoundland (Canada) nel 17-19 September).

Dual class stock unifications and shareholders' wealth expropriation"

BIGELLI, MARCO;
2004

Abstract

An increasing number of firms with dual class shares are deciding to unify their sharesaround the world. In the most common type of stock unification a non-voting share can be converted into a voting share. In most countries either the price differential between the two classes of shares is low or a form of compensation for voting shareholders is provided. Italian stock unifications see the highest value of voting rights and no form of compensation for voting shareholders. I observe the 43 Italian stock unifications made in the 1974-2003 period and I develop a model that quantifies their wealth effects on the two classes of shares. Stock unifications can be a form of expropriation of minority voting shareholders, as confirmed by five case studies where majority shareholders hedge or even take advantage of such unifications by engaging in the following activities some months before the unification decision: buying relevant blocks of nv-shares, selling voting shares or approving stock option plans on nv-shares. At the stock unification announcement the price of a voting share in the five case studies dropped by a minimum of –4.26%, to a maximum of –10.41% confirming that dual class unifications can expropriate minority-voting shareholders to the benefit of the controlling shareholder and “lucky” minority nv-shareholders.
2004
Northern Finance Association
1
43
Dual class stock unifications and shareholders' wealth expropriation" / M Bigelli; V. Mehrotra. - ELETTRONICO. - (2004), pp. 1-43. (Intervento presentato al convegno Northern Finance Association Annual Meeting tenutosi a St. John, Newfoundland (Canada) nel 17-19 September).
M Bigelli; V. Mehrotra
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/50857
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