We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot duopoly where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and, contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) R&D cooperation is socially superior to independent ventures for any spillover level, provided the cost of R&D financing is sufficiently high.

L. Lambertini, G. Rossini (2009). The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers. INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 11, 1-9 [10.1142/S0219198909002157].

The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers

LAMBERTINI, LUCA;ROSSINI, GIANPAOLO
2009

Abstract

We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot duopoly where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and, contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) R&D cooperation is socially superior to independent ventures for any spillover level, provided the cost of R&D financing is sufficiently high.
2009
L. Lambertini, G. Rossini (2009). The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers. INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 11, 1-9 [10.1142/S0219198909002157].
L. Lambertini; G. Rossini
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/49140
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