We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot duopoly where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and, contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) R&D cooperation is socially superior to independent ventures for any spillover level, provided the cost of R&D financing is sufficiently high.
L. Lambertini, G. Rossini (2009). The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers. INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 11, 1-9 [10.1142/S0219198909002157].
The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers
LAMBERTINI, LUCA;ROSSINI, GIANPAOLO
2009
Abstract
We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot duopoly where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and, contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) R&D cooperation is socially superior to independent ventures for any spillover level, provided the cost of R&D financing is sufficiently high.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
