This paper applies the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and studies its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of inefficiency that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice.
E. Bacchiega (2007). Wage Bargaining and Vertical Differentiation. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS, LIV n.1, 35-52.
Wage Bargaining and Vertical Differentiation
BACCHIEGA, EMANUELE
2007
Abstract
This paper applies the Nash Bargaining solution to wage setting in a vertically differentiated oligopoly and studies its welfare effects. The market outcome crucially depends on the bargaining power attributed to the agents. I show that the wage bargaining structure is likely to lead to another source of inefficiency that adds to the classical one derived by oligopoly pricing and quality choice.File in questo prodotto:
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