This paper models a sequential merger formation game with endoge-nous efficiency gains in which every merger has to be submitted for ap-proval to the Antitrust Authority (AA). Two different types of AA arestudied: first, a myopic AA, which judges a given merger without consid-ering that subsequent mergers may occur; and, second, a forward lookingAA, which anticipates the ultimate market structure a given merger willlead to. By contrasting the decisions of these two types of AA, mergerpolicy implications can be drawn. In particular, the efficiency offenceargument does not find any justification under a forward looking AA.
Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game / M. Motta; H. Vasconcelos. - In: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION. - ISSN 0167-7187. - STAMPA. - 23:(2005), pp. 777-801.
Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game
MOTTA, MASSIMO;
2005
Abstract
This paper models a sequential merger formation game with endoge-nous efficiency gains in which every merger has to be submitted for ap-proval to the Antitrust Authority (AA). Two different types of AA arestudied: first, a myopic AA, which judges a given merger without consid-ering that subsequent mergers may occur; and, second, a forward lookingAA, which anticipates the ultimate market structure a given merger willlead to. By contrasting the decisions of these two types of AA, mergerpolicy implications can be drawn. In particular, the efficiency offenceargument does not find any justification under a forward looking AA.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
