This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000) [Buchanan, J., & Yoon, R. Symmetric tragedies: Commons and anticommons. The Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 1–14], we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.
Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz, Jonathan Klick (2006). Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition. INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 26(1), 56-66 [10.1016/j.irle.2006.05.005].
Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition
PARISI, FRANCESCO;
2006
Abstract
This paper recasts current theories of regulatory or legislative competition. Building on the recent contribution of Buchanan and Yoon (2000) [Buchanan, J., & Yoon, R. Symmetric tragedies: Commons and anticommons. The Journal of Law and Economics, 43(1), 1–14], we consider alternative ways in which decision-making competence can be allocated among multiple legislative or administrative bodies. The general model is used to consider the equilibria obtained under different allocations of competence and to formulate some policy considerations.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
