We study law enforcement mechanisms within a population of norm-governed learning agents. We show that a traditional analysis based on expected utility can be misleading, because learning agents tend to comply even though their surveillance is stopped. This has significant implications for the design of self-organising institutions with endogenous resources, where the cost of monitoring and norm enforcement has to be taken into consideration.
R. Riveret, G. Contissa, A. Rotolo, J. V. Pitt (2013). Law enforcement in norm-governed learning agents. Richland, SC (USA) : International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
Law enforcement in norm-governed learning agents
RIVERET, REGIS;CONTISSA, GIUSEPPE;ROTOLO, ANTONINO;
2013
Abstract
We study law enforcement mechanisms within a population of norm-governed learning agents. We show that a traditional analysis based on expected utility can be misleading, because learning agents tend to comply even though their surveillance is stopped. This has significant implications for the design of self-organising institutions with endogenous resources, where the cost of monitoring and norm enforcement has to be taken into consideration.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
