We study law enforcement mechanisms within a population of norm-governed learning agents. We show that a traditional analysis based on expected utility can be misleading, because learning agents tend to comply even though their surveillance is stopped. This has significant implications for the design of self-organising institutions with endogenous resources, where the cost of monitoring and norm enforcement has to be taken into consideration.
Law enforcement in norm-governed learning agents
RIVERET, REGIS;CONTISSA, GIUSEPPE;ROTOLO, ANTONINO;
2013
Abstract
We study law enforcement mechanisms within a population of norm-governed learning agents. We show that a traditional analysis based on expected utility can be misleading, because learning agents tend to comply even though their surveillance is stopped. This has significant implications for the design of self-organising institutions with endogenous resources, where the cost of monitoring and norm enforcement has to be taken into consideration.File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
