Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment.We showthat a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.

Casari M. (2005). On the design of peer punishment experiments. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 8 (2), 107-115 [10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9].

On the design of peer punishment experiments

CASARI, MARCO
2005

Abstract

Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment.We showthat a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.
2005
Casari M. (2005). On the design of peer punishment experiments. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 8 (2), 107-115 [10.1007/s10683-005-0869-9].
Casari M.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/33926
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