In this paper we investigate security problems which occur when exploiting a Linda-like data driven coordination model in an open environment. In this scenario, there is no guarantee that all the agents accessing the shared tuple space are trusted. Starting from a formalization of some typical security properties in the standard Linda coordination model, we present a novel data-driven coordination model which provides mechanisms to support the considered security properties. The first of these mechanisms supports logical partitions of the shared repository: in this way we can restrict the access to tuples stored inside a partition, simply by limiting the access to the partition itself. The second mechanism consists of adding to the tuples some extra information which permits to authenticate the producer of a tuple or to identify its reader/consumer. Finally, we support the possibility to define access control policies based on the kind of operations an agent performs on a tuple, thus discriminating between (destructive) input and (non-destructive) read permissions on each single tuple.

R.Gorrieri, R.Lucchi, G.Zavattaro (2006). Supporting Secure Coordination in SecSpaces. FUNDAMENTA INFORMATICAE, 73(4), 479-506.

Supporting Secure Coordination in SecSpaces

GORRIERI, ROBERTO;LUCCHI, ROBERTO;ZAVATTARO, GIANLUIGI
2006

Abstract

In this paper we investigate security problems which occur when exploiting a Linda-like data driven coordination model in an open environment. In this scenario, there is no guarantee that all the agents accessing the shared tuple space are trusted. Starting from a formalization of some typical security properties in the standard Linda coordination model, we present a novel data-driven coordination model which provides mechanisms to support the considered security properties. The first of these mechanisms supports logical partitions of the shared repository: in this way we can restrict the access to tuples stored inside a partition, simply by limiting the access to the partition itself. The second mechanism consists of adding to the tuples some extra information which permits to authenticate the producer of a tuple or to identify its reader/consumer. Finally, we support the possibility to define access control policies based on the kind of operations an agent performs on a tuple, thus discriminating between (destructive) input and (non-destructive) read permissions on each single tuple.
2006
R.Gorrieri, R.Lucchi, G.Zavattaro (2006). Supporting Secure Coordination in SecSpaces. FUNDAMENTA INFORMATICAE, 73(4), 479-506.
R.Gorrieri; R.Lucchi; G.Zavattaro
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/29272
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