Starting from an "optimal contract design" approach, we present in this paper a theoretical model of an important contract: the "Free Sale" contract. This contract regulates the business relationship in the tourism sector between the Tour Operator and the Hotel, in a typical framework of choices under uncertainty. We make three basic assumptions: (i) a high degree of monopoly power in the tourism market, (ii) a stochastic demand and (iii) a short run temporal horizon for firm decisions. We then derive an optimization problem in which the Tour Operator intends to maximize its expected profit with respect to contractual quantity and price. This optimization problem is subject to two constraints: (i) Hotel participation constraint and (ii) Hotel capacity constraint. Through an analytical solution and a numerical simulation of the model we find the optimal decision rule and the optimal risk allocation rule underlying the contract. In this way, we analyze the design and efficiency consequences - in terms of Pareto optimality of ex-ante decisions and of ex-post profitability - of imperfections arising during contract formation. The final intent is to investigate how to regulate in an optimal way a typical "incomplete contract".

Il contratto ‘vuoto per pieno’: un’analisi economica

MUSSONI, MAURIZIO
2004

Abstract

Starting from an "optimal contract design" approach, we present in this paper a theoretical model of an important contract: the "Free Sale" contract. This contract regulates the business relationship in the tourism sector between the Tour Operator and the Hotel, in a typical framework of choices under uncertainty. We make three basic assumptions: (i) a high degree of monopoly power in the tourism market, (ii) a stochastic demand and (iii) a short run temporal horizon for firm decisions. We then derive an optimization problem in which the Tour Operator intends to maximize its expected profit with respect to contractual quantity and price. This optimization problem is subject to two constraints: (i) Hotel participation constraint and (ii) Hotel capacity constraint. Through an analytical solution and a numerical simulation of the model we find the optimal decision rule and the optimal risk allocation rule underlying the contract. In this way, we analyze the design and efficiency consequences - in terms of Pareto optimality of ex-ante decisions and of ex-post profitability - of imperfections arising during contract formation. The final intent is to investigate how to regulate in an optimal way a typical "incomplete contract".
2004
Mussoni M.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/28476
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