We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria s obtained; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price–quantity supergames.
S. Baldelli, L. Lambertini (2006). Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly Supergame with Nash Punishments. RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, 60, 121-130 [10.1016/j.rie.2006.06.002].
Price vs Quantity in a Duopoly Supergame with Nash Punishments
LAMBERTINI, LUCA
2006
Abstract
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity behaviour in a duopoly supergame with product differentiation. We find that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only symmetric equilibria s obtained; (i) if instead the additional profits available through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution, there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are asymmetric, with firms colluding in price–quantity supergames.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
