The essay reconstructs the Husserl’analyses concerning the themes of reality, highlighting how this investigation appears in connection with transcendental structure of phenomenology. Starting from an opening phase of metaphysical neutrality, the question of reality has in fact a real phenomenological meaning only in the context of transcendental phenomenology, namely with reference to the costitutive themes of functioning intentionality, disclosed by the phenomenological reduction. I argue that the trascendental phenomenology thematizes the correlation between subjectivity and world. Consequently, the phenomenological reflection does not dissolve the reality into the consciousness and does not eliminate idealistically the belief in the trascendent existence of reality, but justifies such belief in terms of a realism that is in accordance with the conditions of the possibility of phenomenological experience, which however are very different from those of Kant’s empirical realism. Through the attempt to understand and account for the realism that is intrinsic to the natural attitude, Husserl contrasts the countersense of the dogmatic objectivism, assuming a kind of realism that appears able to successfully oppose the sceptical challenge. 2.Besoli.

Intorno alla nozione fenomenologica di realtà e alla sua genesi trascendentale

BESOLI, STEFANO
2013

Abstract

The essay reconstructs the Husserl’analyses concerning the themes of reality, highlighting how this investigation appears in connection with transcendental structure of phenomenology. Starting from an opening phase of metaphysical neutrality, the question of reality has in fact a real phenomenological meaning only in the context of transcendental phenomenology, namely with reference to the costitutive themes of functioning intentionality, disclosed by the phenomenological reduction. I argue that the trascendental phenomenology thematizes the correlation between subjectivity and world. Consequently, the phenomenological reflection does not dissolve the reality into the consciousness and does not eliminate idealistically the belief in the trascendent existence of reality, but justifies such belief in terms of a realism that is in accordance with the conditions of the possibility of phenomenological experience, which however are very different from those of Kant’s empirical realism. Through the attempt to understand and account for the realism that is intrinsic to the natural attitude, Husserl contrasts the countersense of the dogmatic objectivism, assuming a kind of realism that appears able to successfully oppose the sceptical challenge. 2.Besoli.
2013
S. Besoli
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/234500
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