Forty years ago, Harvey Sacks argued that “It is possible that the detailed study of small phenomena may give an enormous understanding of the way humans do things and the kinds of objects they use to construct and order their affairs” (Sacks 1984, 24). Working on his legacy, this chapter addresses a philosophical macro issue – the linguistic construction of scientific knowledge – from a micro standpoint : the detailed analysis of interactional small phenomena occurring during research interviewing . We theoretically contend and empirically illustrate that most of the ordinary actions implied in scientific practices (Lynch 1993) are purifying activities aimed to clean discursive data from uncertainty-marks and relativization cues (e.g. alerts to approximation (Weatherall 2011), prospective and retrospective epistemic hedges (Caronia 1997), minimal agreement and low voice (Antaki 2006). We contend that ignoring these markers is an invisible certainty-building practice consistent with and functional to the enduring (and recently renewed, see De Caro and Ferraris 2012) vision of (scientific) knowledge as a mirror of reality.
L. Caronia (2014). The fabric of certainty: Ignoring interactional details as an epistemic resource in research interviews. Amsterdam/Philadelphia : John Benjamins Publishing Company.
The fabric of certainty: Ignoring interactional details as an epistemic resource in research interviews
CARONIA, LETIZIA
2014
Abstract
Forty years ago, Harvey Sacks argued that “It is possible that the detailed study of small phenomena may give an enormous understanding of the way humans do things and the kinds of objects they use to construct and order their affairs” (Sacks 1984, 24). Working on his legacy, this chapter addresses a philosophical macro issue – the linguistic construction of scientific knowledge – from a micro standpoint : the detailed analysis of interactional small phenomena occurring during research interviewing . We theoretically contend and empirically illustrate that most of the ordinary actions implied in scientific practices (Lynch 1993) are purifying activities aimed to clean discursive data from uncertainty-marks and relativization cues (e.g. alerts to approximation (Weatherall 2011), prospective and retrospective epistemic hedges (Caronia 1997), minimal agreement and low voice (Antaki 2006). We contend that ignoring these markers is an invisible certainty-building practice consistent with and functional to the enduring (and recently renewed, see De Caro and Ferraris 2012) vision of (scientific) knowledge as a mirror of reality.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
