In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy, Rania Mabrouk (2013). Paying not to sell. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 121, 137-140 [10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.018].

Paying not to sell

BACCHIEGA, EMANUELE;
2013

Abstract

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.
2013
Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy, Rania Mabrouk (2013). Paying not to sell. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 121, 137-140 [10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.018].
Emanuele Bacchiega; Olivier Bonroy; Rania Mabrouk
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/173260
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