In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.
Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy, Rania Mabrouk (2013). Paying not to sell. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 121, 137-140 [10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.018].
Paying not to sell
BACCHIEGA, EMANUELE;
2013
Abstract
In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.File in questo prodotto:
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