In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.
Binding promises and cooperation among strangers / G. Camera; M. Casari; M. Bigoni. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 3:(2013), pp. 459-461. [10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.009]
Binding promises and cooperation among strangers
G. Camera;CASARI, MARCO;BIGONI, MARIA
2013
Abstract
In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
