In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.
G. Camera, M. Casari, M. Bigoni (2013). Binding promises and cooperation among strangers. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 3, 459-461 [10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.009].
Binding promises and cooperation among strangers
G. Camera;CASARI, MARCO;BIGONI, MARIA
2013
Abstract
In an experiment, a group of strangers was randomly divided in pairs to play a prisoners’ dilemma; this process was indefinitely repeated. Cooperation did not increase when subjects could send public messages amounting to binding promises of future play.File in questo prodotto:
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