Attackers able to compromise the memory of a target machine can change its behavior and usually gain complete control over it. Despite the ingenious prevention and protection mechanisms that have been implemented in modern operating systems, memory corruption attacks still account for a big share of the security breaches afflicting software systems. This article describes a growing attack trend that uses return-oriented programming (ROP) techniques to bypass the most common memory protection systems.
Return-Oriented Programming / M. Prandini; M. Ramilli. - In: IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY. - ISSN 1540-7993. - STAMPA. - 10:(2012), pp. 84-87. [10.1109/MSP.2012.152]
Return-Oriented Programming
PRANDINI, MARCO;RAMILLI, MARCO
2012
Abstract
Attackers able to compromise the memory of a target machine can change its behavior and usually gain complete control over it. Despite the ingenious prevention and protection mechanisms that have been implemented in modern operating systems, memory corruption attacks still account for a big share of the security breaches afflicting software systems. This article describes a growing attack trend that uses return-oriented programming (ROP) techniques to bypass the most common memory protection systems.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
