My note is about a recent book, Moore and Wittgenstein, by Annalisa Coliva. Coliva acknowledges Moore's particular standing concerning scepticism but doesn't concede it to be a good reply to scepticism, whereas she deems Wittgenstein's arguments in "On Certainty" very valuable. I argue, instead, that Moore's argument is very sophisticated and that it encompasses more contributions than those considered by Coliva. At the same time, I disagree both with her evaluation of Wittgenstein's contribution and with her rendering of the contribution itself. At the end I make a proposal for understanding Moore's suggestion picking up the coordinative definitions suggested by Hans Reichenbach.
P. Leonardi (2013). Moore and Wittgenstein. PHILOSOPHIA, 41(1), 51-61 [10.1007/s11406-012-9404-3].
Moore and Wittgenstein
LEONARDI, PAOLO
2013
Abstract
My note is about a recent book, Moore and Wittgenstein, by Annalisa Coliva. Coliva acknowledges Moore's particular standing concerning scepticism but doesn't concede it to be a good reply to scepticism, whereas she deems Wittgenstein's arguments in "On Certainty" very valuable. I argue, instead, that Moore's argument is very sophisticated and that it encompasses more contributions than those considered by Coliva. At the same time, I disagree both with her evaluation of Wittgenstein's contribution and with her rendering of the contribution itself. At the end I make a proposal for understanding Moore's suggestion picking up the coordinative definitions suggested by Hans Reichenbach.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
