The coordinated competitive effects of silent ownerships in rival firms is investigated, to provide a general comparative static result and to examine to what extent existing results are compatible with a general scenario in which no restriction is placed on the levels of reciprocal ownership stakes.
C. Corradi, M.C. Corradi (2004). Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion: a comment. RENDICONTI PER GLI STUDI ECONOMICI QUANTITATIVI, 1, 27-34.
Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion: a comment
CORRADI, CORRADO;
2004
Abstract
The coordinated competitive effects of silent ownerships in rival firms is investigated, to provide a general comparative static result and to examine to what extent existing results are compatible with a general scenario in which no restriction is placed on the levels of reciprocal ownership stakes.File in questo prodotto:
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