This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well-run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white-collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.
M. Bigoni, S.O. Fridolfsson, C. Le Coq, G. Spagnolo (2012). Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 43(2), 368-390 [10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x].
Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust
BIGONI, MARIA;
2012
Abstract
This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well-run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white-collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
