We set up a model to study how ownership structure, corporate law and employment law interact to set the incentives that influence the decision by a large shareholder or manager effectively controlling the firm whether to divert resources from minority shareholders and employees.
Ecchia, G., Gelter, M., Pasotti, P. (2012). Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs of Expropriation. REVIEW OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 8(2), 457-486 [10.1515/1555-5879.1357].
Corporate Governance, Corporate and Employment Law, and the Costs of Expropriation
ECCHIA, GIULIO;PASOTTI, PIERO
2012
Abstract
We set up a model to study how ownership structure, corporate law and employment law interact to set the incentives that influence the decision by a large shareholder or manager effectively controlling the firm whether to divert resources from minority shareholders and employees.File in questo prodotto:
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