The rise of interest in the importance of emotion in argumentation over the last decade, has certainly thrown into question the once widespread myth that argumentation is in its essence rational. Within Argumentation Theory, the importance of emotion in argument is highly acknowledged (Walton, 1992, 1996, 2000; Plantin, 1998; Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003). More generally, if we look at communication processes, the importance and role of emotive dimensions in discourse practice (Lupton, 1998) and more specifically in dialogue (Weigand, 1998, 2003) is also claimed. Whereof a first claim (emotion vs. rationality) can be identified within contemporary research trends on argumentation fostering emotions in spite of the classical prejudice against them (cf. Sapir, 1921 as acknowledged in Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2000). […] In this respect, claims are also there now against the classical “strong presumption of the essential […] rationality of human behaviour” & Grice’s (1975) Co-operative Principle (Daneš, 2003: 10). More specifically, contemporary researchers on argumentation divide into those who strongly promote the “essential, if not unexceptional rationality of human behaviour” (Daneš, 2000: 10), as it is highly represented by Grice’s Co-operative principle and the conversational maxims (Quality, Quantity, Relevance and Manners), and those who, starting from empirical research, claim that “it is no longer feasible to base one’s theory of communication [and as a consequence one’s description of argumentation] upon unexamined principles of (instrumental rationality)” (Daneš, 2000: 10, also in reference to Marcelo Dascal’s work). Focussing on dialogic argumentation, a similar argument has been also formulated by Weigand, claiming that “[h]uman beings are not only rationally and conventionally acting human beings: […] amongst the principles guiding action games there are the Principles of Emotion” (1998: 39). For he first claim we have above identified within contemporary research trends on (dialogic) argumentation (emotion vs. rationality, claim 1), can be implemented and specified into a second correlated claim that is: emotion vs. rationality and essential co-operation (rationality ~ co-operation, claim 2) Following this short discussion, a chasm could be drown for visualizing the variation in the definition of dialogic argumentation along the decades and according to different perspectives, ranging from rational to (vs.) emotional and from co-operative to (vs.) non (forcedly) co-operative. […]

Arguing for Love

FERRARI, FEDERICA
2008

Abstract

The rise of interest in the importance of emotion in argumentation over the last decade, has certainly thrown into question the once widespread myth that argumentation is in its essence rational. Within Argumentation Theory, the importance of emotion in argument is highly acknowledged (Walton, 1992, 1996, 2000; Plantin, 1998; Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003). More generally, if we look at communication processes, the importance and role of emotive dimensions in discourse practice (Lupton, 1998) and more specifically in dialogue (Weigand, 1998, 2003) is also claimed. Whereof a first claim (emotion vs. rationality) can be identified within contemporary research trends on argumentation fostering emotions in spite of the classical prejudice against them (cf. Sapir, 1921 as acknowledged in Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2000). […] In this respect, claims are also there now against the classical “strong presumption of the essential […] rationality of human behaviour” & Grice’s (1975) Co-operative Principle (Daneš, 2003: 10). More specifically, contemporary researchers on argumentation divide into those who strongly promote the “essential, if not unexceptional rationality of human behaviour” (Daneš, 2000: 10), as it is highly represented by Grice’s Co-operative principle and the conversational maxims (Quality, Quantity, Relevance and Manners), and those who, starting from empirical research, claim that “it is no longer feasible to base one’s theory of communication [and as a consequence one’s description of argumentation] upon unexamined principles of (instrumental rationality)” (Daneš, 2000: 10, also in reference to Marcelo Dascal’s work). Focussing on dialogic argumentation, a similar argument has been also formulated by Weigand, claiming that “[h]uman beings are not only rationally and conventionally acting human beings: […] amongst the principles guiding action games there are the Principles of Emotion” (1998: 39). For he first claim we have above identified within contemporary research trends on (dialogic) argumentation (emotion vs. rationality, claim 1), can be implemented and specified into a second correlated claim that is: emotion vs. rationality and essential co-operation (rationality ~ co-operation, claim 2) Following this short discussion, a chasm could be drown for visualizing the variation in the definition of dialogic argumentation along the decades and according to different perspectives, ranging from rational to (vs.) emotional and from co-operative to (vs.) non (forcedly) co-operative. […]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/111731
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